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Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a rapid proliferation of radical Islamist activity in 
Britain, best illustrated by both actual terrorist atrocities (such as those carried out on 
the London transport network in 2005), and MI5’s sensational warning in 2006 of 30 
incipient “terror plots” and 1,600 individuals then under surveillance.2 Many of these 
cases have included individuals willing to countenance their own self-immolation in 
furtherance of their beliefs and cause, or in the perceived defence of their faith and 
community (ummah).  
These cases confound and perplex our modern sensibilities. How could they 
do such a thing we collectively ponder? What could possibly compel ostensibly well-
adjusted, educated, and indeed integrated young Britons (which virtually all are) to 
adopt such a bleak outlook on life; one in which they felt of greater worth, dead than 
alive? Why were their familial ties, social networks, careers, aspirations, passions, 
interests, possessions and myriad other connections to reality, not sufficient to anchor 
them to ‘this worldly life’.  
Muhammad Siddique Khan for example, the ringleader of the 7/7 London 
Transport Network bombings, epitomises these tensions and contradictions. Khan’s 
posthumously released farewell video message recorded with his infant daughter, 
reveals his increasingly conflicted emotions over his impending suicide mission. The 
video highlights Khan’s clear adoration and affection for his daughter, starkly 
juxtaposed against what appears to be a profound sense of duty and sacrifice. How do 
we reconcile Khan’s tender paternal instincts and ‘rootedness’ in this world, with the 
seemingly incongruous acts of carnage later committed, which of course took his own 
life too. Moreover, considering Khan’s seemingly successful background (a university 
education, a well-regarded job and career, a loving family) – by all accounts, not 
                                                 
1 This phrase is taken from a letter recovered soon after the 9/11 attacks and is thought to be the final 
instructions given to the lead hijacker, Mohammed Atta, and reads “Purify your soul from all unclean 
things. Completely forget something called ‘this worldly life’”; Available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/atta/resources/documents/instructions1.htm 
2 Akil N. Awan, ‘Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism Among Muslim Communities in 
Europe’, PS: Political Science & Politics 41, no. 01 (2008): 13. 
uncommon amongst radical Islamists, what lay behind the eventual recourse to 
‘martyrdom’. 
These ‘martyrdom’ operations, as they are alluded to in the idiom of 
contemporary Jihadist discourse, may represent the apogee of Jihadist praxis to its 
adherents, but are only the most strikingly visible and shocking manifestation of the 
phenomenon. Indeed, it is more helpful to view the range of acts that fall under the 
rubric of radical Islam or Jihadism as constituting part of a much broader spectrum, in 
which terrorism and martyrdom are only one of a number of the possible outcomes. 
Other manifestations of this ideology or other forms of Jihadist ‘praxis’ do exist and 
in fact are far more prevalent than martyrdom, but nevertheless, all stem from the 
same shared ideology and worldview. Whilst this paper is principally concerned with 
contemporary Jihadist articulations of martyrdom in Britain, we must acknowledge 
the commonalities that exist in the motivations, antecedents, processes and trajectories 
of those drawn to radical Islam, irrespective of whether martyrdom is the desired, or 
indeed unintended, outcome. 
This paper attempts to engage with these complex issues by providing a fuller, 
more nuanced understanding of some of the motivations and causes of Jihadist 
martyrdom in Britian, by exploring the life narratives of a number of these 
individuals. In addition, the paper seeks to explore the contemporary relevance of 
traditional and historical Islamic notions of martyrdom and Jihad and their seemingly 
profound resonance with these modern day shuhadā (martyrs).  
 
Martyrdom in Islam 
The word shahīd (martyr) in the Quran, stems from the Arabic verb ‘to see’ or ‘to 
witness’,3 closely mirroring its Latin equivalent in both etymology and usage.4 
Indeed, the Islamic conceptualisation of martyrdom also correlates closely with 
Western understandings. In the technical language of the Church, the martyr 
represents those who die in, or as a result of, odium fidei (hatred of the faith).5 Weiner 
                                                 
3 For example, the Quran mentions bearing witness to righteousness and piety (2:143) or bearing 
witness to financial transactions (2:282). 
4 The use of word martyr as witness, was originally employed within both the secular and sacred 
spheres (as articulated in the New Testament); Allison Trites, The New Testament Concept of Witness, 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
5 Cunningham, Lawrence, ‘Christian Martyrdom: A Theological Perspective’, in Witness of the Body : 
the Past, Present, and Future of Christian Martyrdom, ed. Michael Budde and Scott, Karen (Grand 
Rapids Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2011), 14. 
and Weiner expand on this theological understanding by suggesting that a historical 
examination of Judeo-Christian martyrs points to three principle types: i) those that 
elect to suffer and die rather than reject their faith or principles; ii) those that suffer 
torture and death as a result of their convictions; and iii) those that endure great 
suffering for long periods of time.6 It is this historical understanding of martyrdom 
that has strongest parallels within the Islamic tradition, which not only recognises 
persecution on account of faith, but also various forms of worldly suffering as worthy 
of istishād (martyrdom).7  
However, the distinctly Islamic conception of istishād as death during Jihad,8 
has much more tenuous links to the Judeo-Christian tradition, but nevertheless 
remains the most popularly recognisable conceptualisation of martyrdom within 
Islam, particularly in the West. This peculiar category of martyrdom as death ‘whilst 
striving in the path of God’ (the literal translation of Jihad), has generally been 
associated with death on the battlefield in God’s cause.9 However, crucially, it is not 
primarily the type of activity engaged in prior to death that confers martyrdom, but 
rather the intention (niyyah) upon which the activity was predicated. So, for example, 
a well-known tradition relates, 
Whoever leaves his house in the way of God then dies or is killed is a martyr, whether his 
horse or camel tramples him, or a venomous animal stings him, or he dies in his bed, or in 
any kind of death God wills, truly he is a martyr and shall have Paradise.”10 
Moreover, the Islamic canon also introduces the concept of martyrdom as death in any 
defensive context,  
“Whoever is killed defending his wealth is a martyr; whoever is killed defending his religion 
is a martyr; whoever is killed in self-defence is a martyr.”11  
The idea of defence here is broad enough to subsume a great number of activities and 
thus lends itself to a great multiplicity of interpretations vis-à-vis achieving 
martyrdom. Indeed, it is this vagueness of definition that has largely engendered the 
proliferation of modern day Jihadist martyrdom-seekers (istishādi).  
                                                 
6 Eugene Weiner and Anita Weiner, The Martyr’s Conviction : a Sociological Analysis (Lanham  Md.: 
University Press of America, 2002). 
7 Examples of worldly suffering worthy of martyrdom include death from drowning, plague, fire, and 
during childbirth, see for example Muhammad bin Ismail Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut: Dar al-
Fikr, 1991), iii, nos. 2829–30. 
8 Ibid., no. 2829. 
9 See for example Quran 3:140 which refers to the martyrs from one of the earliest battles during 
Muhammad’s life, the Battle of Uhud. 
10 Sunan Abi Dawud and al-Hakim. 
11 al-Tirmidhi, 1421. 
 The conceptualisation of martyrdom in Islam has not remained static, and as 
Cook’s masterly historical study of martyrdom shows, the legal and social basis of 
that which constitutes martyrdom has changed significantly throughout the Muslim 
world over time.12 Our concerns here, however, are with contemporary articulations 
of martyrdom amongst Jihadists, such as those of al-Qaeda and their ilk, and despite 
the rhetoric of these modern day Salafi-Jihadists,13 invoking the precedents of the first 
three generations in Islam as the basis for their praxis,14 theirs is in fact a very modern 
understanding of martyrdom that draws on eclectic sources of legitimacy and 
authority.15  
 
The Obfuscation of Martyrdom with Terrorism. 
In recent years there has been a general conflation of martyrdom in the Islamic 
tradition with terrorism, to such an extent, that the suicide bomber is now popularly 
perceived to be the archetypaal Islamic martyr.16 However, this characterisation is 
highly problematic for a number of reasons. The ‘Muslim suicide bombing’ or 
‘martyrdom operation’ is a relatively recent phenomenon borrowed largely from 
secular nationalist groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.17 Indeed, 
even the seminal jihadi literature from the 1980s concerning Afghanistan, for 
example, does not mention ‘martyrdom operations’.18 Moreover, the development of 
suicide bombing as a tactic is almost entirely predicated upon technological advances 
in the manufacture of explosives in the late 20th Century, thus rendering it a highly 
                                                 
12 David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
13 The term Salafi-Jihadism was first used by Giles Kepel to describe Salafists who began to develop 
an interest in Jihad in the early 1990s; Gilles Kepel, Jihad : the Trail of Political Islam, 4th ed. 
(London: New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006).  
14 Salafism refers to a broad body of Muslims, whose views range from the peaceful apolitical to 
politically violent terrorists. They are generally characterised by a fundamentalist worldview,  
particularly their reverence for the sacred texts in their most literal form, and follow the practices and 
precedents of the pious predecessors (the as-Salaf as-Salih), who are usually understood to represent 
the historic first three generations of Muslims. 
15 See for example, Akil N. Awan, Andrew Hoskins, and Ben O’Loughlin, Radicalisation and Media : 
Connectivity and Terrorism in the New Media Ecology (London: Routledge, 2011), 25–47.  
16 Indeed, the very title of this volume is testament to the amalgamation of these two terms in both 
popular and academic discourse. 
17 The suicide bombing was pioneered by others, particularly secular Lebanese groups, but it is the 
Tamil Tigers who ultimately ‘mastered’ the tactic; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Rev. and 
expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
18 David Cook, ‘Suicide Attacks or “Martyrdom Operations” in Contemporary Jihad               
Literature’, Nova Religio 6, no. 1 (October 2002): 8. 
modern innovation with no real historical precedents in Islamic praxis.19 Perhaps most 
problematic is that the act of suicide is itself categorically prohibited in the canonical 
texts of Islam,20 and suicide bombings often violate other fundamental religious 
precepts, such as targeting non-combatants,21 thereby posing serious legitimation 
challenges to the Islamic appropriation and sanctification of the suicide bomber. 
However, one could argue that these are moot points, for whatever the 
theological and historical obstacles to locating suicide bombing within the realm of 
Islamic martyrdom, it remains an indelible statistical fact that Muslims have been 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of suicide bombing attacks in the last few 
decades. According to Robert Pape, 224 of the 300 suicide attacks between 1980 and 
2003 were carried out by Islamist groups or occurred in predominantly Muslim 
countries.22 If one examines the suicide attacks after 2003 (when Pape’s survey ends), 
the bias is skewed even further towards Muslim perpetrators.23 Moreover, these 
individuals not only considered themselves to be Muslims, but martyrdom in the 
name of Islam provided (at least in their minds) the raison d’etre for their acts of self-
immolation. 
Nevertheless, these statistics do not necessarily exonerate the modern-day 
obfuscation and linkage between Islamic martyrdom and terrorism, which should be 
noted, is largely attributable to the modern mass media. Whilst it may be correct to 
state that the vast majority of suicide bombers today are Muslim ‘martyrs’, the 
obverse is not. Indeed, the vast majority of modern day ‘Islamic martyrdoms’ have 
occurred not through suicide bombings or associated acts of terrorism, but instead as 
the outcome of more conventional warfare, on the battlefields of Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Chechnya, the Palestinian Territories, Iraq and various other theatres of conflict 
raging in the Muslim world. For Muslim audiences, the martyrs created within these 
arenas include not only the dead combatants who were engaged in conventional and 
legitimate modes of warfare, but perhaps more importantly, the large numbers of 
civilians also killed as ‘collateral damage’.  
                                                 
19 The closest parallel is found in historical accounts of individual Muslim fighters charging enemy 
lines during battle in displays of heroism and personal valour, in the knowledge that they would 
probably not survive the encounter (al-inghimas fi as-saf); Cook, Martyrdom in Islam.  
20 See for example, Qur’an 2: 195 and 4: 29. 
21 See for example al-Bukhari 4:26 [nos. 3014-5]. 
22 Robert Pape, Dying to Win : the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. (New York: Random House, 
2005), 15.    
23 See for example, Scott Atran, ‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism’, The Washington 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2006): 127–47;  
Conversely, the suicide terrorists who are posthumously recast as martyrs by 
the Jihadists represent a much smaller, but nevertheless highly visible, minority 
within the faith. It is with these individuals that this paper is principally concerned, 
and it is to their attraction to this peculiar form of ‘martyrdom’ that we now turn. 
 
Appeal of Martyrdom amongst Jihadists 
In explaining the putative appeal of martyrdom amongst contemporary British 
Jihadists, it is now clear that motivations can often be amorphous and complex and 
with no simple cause and effect calculus appearing to be tenable.24 Instead, 
individuals may be drawn to the prospect of becoming martyrs for a multitude of, 
sometimes conflicting, reasons. Here we are not concerned primarily with the reasons 
behind the adoption of suicide bombing as a tactic by modern terrorist organisations. 
Indeed, a number of studies have attempted to explain the underlying strategic reasons 
for the adoption of ‘martyrdom operations’ by terrorist organisations, identifying 
factors such as tactical efficacy, symbolic-value, out-bidding and intra-group 
competition, and societal support.25  
Instead, we are principally concerned with the appeal of martyrdom amongst 
individuals recruited to the organisation or cause, which has tended to receive far less 
rigorous academic focus. Moreover, those studies that have attempted to elucidate 
suicide bombers’ individual motivations typically create taxonomies that demarcate 
personal motivations as being verifiably distinct from ideological motivations.26 This 
approach is highly problematic, however, for it assumes an innate dichotomy in 
motivations which is clearly not borne out in reality. Instead, it is extremely difficult, 
if not nigh impossible, to delineate that which is personal from the political, and more 
crucially, how the two spheres intersect to manifest violence; or as Carol Hanisch 
famously stated ‘the personal is political’.27  
                                                 
24 Akil N. Awan, ‘Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism Among Muslim Communities in 
Europe’, PS: Political Science & Politics 41, no. 01 (2008): 16. 
25 See for example, Pape, Dying to Win; Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, 
Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (JHU Press, 2008); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill : the 
Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).  
26 See for example, Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (London: Polity Press, 2005). 
27 Carol Hanisch, ‘The Personal Is Political’, in Notes From the Second Year: Women’s Liberation: 
Major Writings of the Radical Feminists, ed. Meredith Tax, et al., (New York: Sulamith Firestone and 
Anne Koedt, 1970). See also, C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1959) who famously discussed the intersection of public issues and personal 
problems. 
 Following Max Weber’s classic postulation of ideal types,28 we can tentatively 
identify three broad motivational motifs underlying martyrdom amongst British 
jihadists, namely: i) Altruism & Identity; ii) Religion & Salvation; and iii) Impotence 
& Ennui. By motifs we mean the key defining experiences or themes which make 
each type of martyrdom substantially different and distinctive. Whilst we do not wish 
to contest the uniqueness of each convert’s individual experiences, or dispute the 
patently high degree of biographical specificity contained within each individual’s life 
narrative, these motifs are considered to be broad enough to be able to subsume the 
diversity of motivating factors from within our sample, under their respective 
overarching rubrics. In addition, if radicalisation towards Jihadism entails a process, 
as has been convincingly argued by myself and others,29 then we must also 
acknowledge the existence of a range of potential motivations that may span the 
journey towards eventual martyrdom; the impulse for joining the cause may be very 
different to the incentive for remaining committed to the group or network, which in 
turn may be quite distinct from the eventual motivation for embarking on a suicide 
mission. Moreover, these broad explanatory frameworks should not be considered to 
be in any way mutually exclusive. Rather, individuals may exhibit aspects of multiple 
motifs at any given time, particularly as different motifs may become more or less 
salient at different stages over the course of their trajectory to martyrdom. Finally, in 
some cases it may also prove problematic to definitively discern a hierarchy of 
motivational motifs from an individual’s life narrative. 
 
i) Altruism & Identity 
To Western audiences inured to depictions of Jihadist suicide bombers as either evil, 
bloodthirsty savages or deranged, religious zealots,30 there must be something 
inherently incongruous and deeply unsettling about recognising the essentially 
altruistic nature of suicide bombing.31 However, as discomfiting as this revelation 
                                                 
28 Max Weber, Methodology of Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949), 89. 
29 Awan, ‘Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism Among Muslim Communities in Europe’; 
Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin, Radicalisation and the Media; Clark R. McCauley, Friction: How 
Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
30 For more on this general characterisation see, Atran, ‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide 
Terrorism’; Scott Atran, ‘Soft Power and the Psychology of Suicide Bombing’, Global Terrorism 
Analysis 2, no. 11 (2004). 
31 A point corroborated by Durkheim's sociological taxonomy of suicide, through which ‘martyrdom 
operations’ can also considered to be altruistic in nature. See, Émile Durkheim, Suicide : a study in 
may be, it is nevertheless important to recognise that many individuals that undertake, 
or at least attempt, ‘martyrdom operations’ tend to do so for largely selfless reasons, 
being sincerely compassionate to those they see themselves as helping.32 Indeed, 
empathy for fellow Muslims inculcate many potential radical Islamists with a 
profound sense of duty and justice, which finds effective expression through the 
conduit of Jihadism. For example, Hussain Osman - one of the failed 21st July 
bombers, told Italian investigators that during preparations for the attack the cell 
steeled its resolve by, 
 “…watching films on the war in Iraq…especially those where women and children 
were being killed and exterminated by British and American soldiers... of widows, 
mothers and daughters that cry”.33 
 
Similarly, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian graduate of the University College 
London, who failed to detonate explosive-lined underwear on a trans-Atlantic flight in 
2009, justified his actions to US prosecutors by stating, 
“I carried with me an explosive device onto Northwest 253, again, to avenge the killing of my 
innocent Muslim brothers and sisters by the U.S…and in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel 
and Israeli massacres of innocent Palestinians, [and] for the United States tyranny and 
oppression of Muslims… I attempted to use an explosive device which in the U.S. law is a 
weapon of mass destruction, which I call a blessed weapon to save the lives of innocent 
Muslims, for U.S. use of weapons of mass destruction on Muslim populations in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Yemen, and beyond.”34 
Robert Pape’s comprehensive study of suicide terrorism corroborates this view by 
suggesting that suicide bombings are almost always conceived of as a liberation 
strategy in response to occupation that places the community over and above the self; 
this is the very reason why the occupied communities often perceive them as martyrs 
and consider their actions to be altruistic.35  
We may dispute the notion that the suicide terrorists who carried out the 9/11 
World Trade Center attacks, or the 7/7 London transport network bombings hailed 
from ‘occupied’ communities,36 however, to do so would be to ignore the communal 
                                                                                                                                            
sociology, trans. George Simpson (London; New York: Routledge, 1897); Steven Stack, ‘Emile 
Durkheim and Altruistic Suicide’, Archives of Suicide Research 8, no. 1 (2004): 9–22. 
32 Atran, ‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism’. 
33 C. Fusani, ‘“Non Volevamo Colpire l’Italia” La Lunga Confessione Nella Notte’, La Repubblica, 30 
July 2005. 
34 Detroit Free Press, ‘Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s Statement on Guilty Plea’, Detroit Free Press, 
October 12, 2011. 
35 Pape, Dying to Win. 
36 In the case of 9/11 at least, it is clear that the large number of U.S. troops stationed in the Arabian 
Gulf, particularly in the hijaz during the First Gulf War, was seen as an occupation by al-Qaeda and 
and supra-national nature of radical Islamist discourse, and the widely held 
perceptions of Western domination and hegemony in the Muslim world more broadly. 
Indeed, one of the cornerstones of Jihadist discourse has been the rejection of a more 
parochial conceptualisation of community that is predicated upon the traditional 
ambits of ethnicity or nationalism, in favour of a global community of belief instead. 
As an example of the championing of this global community of belief and purpose – 
the ummah, the Global Islamic Media Front, a prominent media organ of al-Qaeda 
stated in 2005, “The [battle]front does not belong to anyone. It is the property of all 
zealous Muslims and knows no geographical boundaries”.37 This official endorsement 
of the Ummah as the sole locus of identity and belonging is often echoed in the 
language of individual ‘martyrs’ themselves. Shahzad Tanweer - one of the 7/7 
bombers, for example, attempted to justify his actions by pointing to British tacit 
support for injustices perpetrated against his ‘fictive kin’:38 
“To the non-Muslims of Britain you may wonder what you have done to deserve this. You 
have those who have voted in your government who in turn have and still continue to this day 
continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters from the east to the west in 
Palestine ... Iraq and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported the genocide of over 
50,000 innocent Muslims.  
You will never experience peace until our children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in 
Kashmir, our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq live in peace. 
Our blood flows across the earth, Muslim blood has become cheap Better those who will 
avenge the blood of our children in Palestine and the rapes and massacres of our sisters in 
Kashmir.”39  
Similarly, Mohammed Siddique Khan, in his posthumously released ‘martyrdom’ 
testament, repeatedly invoked a communal identity in which he identified the 
subjugation of his community as being principle amongst his grievances: 
“Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my 
people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I 
am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we 
                                                                                                                                            
their supporters, and indeed the removal of US troops constitutes the earliest articulated demand by 
Osama bin Laden. See, ‘The Ladinese Epistle: Declaration of War (I)’, MSANEWS, October 12, 1996, 
http://msanews.mynet.net//MSANEWS/199610/19961012.3. 
37 Cited in Awan, ‘Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism Among Muslim Communities in 
Europe’, 222. 
38 This term is borrowed from S. Atran, ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’, Science 299, no. 5612 (7 
March 2003): 1534. 
39 Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/oct/15/terrorism.alqaida1 
feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment 
and torture of my people we will not stop this fight”.40  
Khan and Tanweer exhibit a confusing and melodramatic sense of duty to this 
nebulous and disparate body of peoples (‘my Muslim brothers and sisters’, ‘our 
children in Palestine’, ‘our mothers and sisters in Kashmir’), who ultimately become 
the object of their altruistic sacrifice, despite the fact that neither has little direct 
connection to, or identification with them (in terms of ethnicity, nationality, language, 
culture or customs to name but a few salient markers of identity). This attitude is all 
the more perplexing when juxtaposed against the feelings of indifference and open 
hostility displayed towards their British victims, with whom they did actually share 
many facets of their identity. This disconcertingly misplaced identification can be 
partially explained through a process I describe elsewhere as dual cultural alterity.41 
 
Dual Cultural Alterity  
This phenomenon refers to a staunch repudiation of, or at least a distinct lack of 
identification with, both minority (ethnic or parental) culture, and majority 
(mainstream or host society) culture, as a result of being unable or unwilling to fulfil 
either group’s normative expectations, and thus is likely to inspire feelings of 
uprootedness and lack of belonging. 
Minority culture may be relegated to obsolescence for a number of reasons 
including, the imposition of conservative socio-sexual mores; a profound sense of 
alienation from one’s family;42 and the presence of cultural power structures (such as 
the South Asian biraderi), which can have the ostensive effect of divesting youth of 
any real tangible control over their own lives. The Home Office Report Preventing 
Extremism Together Working Groups, hastily compiled in the wake of 7/7 
concurred,43 
                                                 
40 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm 
41 Akil N Awan, ‘Transitional Religiosity Experiences: Contextual Disjuncture and Islamic Political 
Radicalism’, in Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Comparative Perspective, ed. Tahir Abbas 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 219. 
42 Indeed, in the cases presented before us, none of the families appear to have been cognizant of the 
paths upon which their children were embarked: Hasib Hussain’s distraught mother, unaware of her 
son’s actions, reported him missing to the Police Casualty Bureau on the evening of July 7 th; Jason 
Burke et al., ‘Three Cities, Four Killers’, The Observer, July 17, 2005. Similarly, Mukhtar Said 
Ibrahim, one of the failed bombers on July 21st was only identified after his bewildered family 
recognised their estranged son from CCTV images distributed throughout the media; Duncan Gardham 
and Philip Johnston, ‘Terror Suspect Is a Convicted Mugger - Telegraph’, The Telegraph, July 27, 
2005. 
43 Home Office Working Groups, Preventing Extremism Together (London: Home Office, 2005), 15. 
 “Many young Muslims feel that they do not have a voice or a legitimate outlet for 
protest, political expression, or dissent. Leadership roles are traditionally held by the 
elders, and the young people can feel frustrated at their inability to actively engage in 
decision making structures.”44 
 
Perhaps the most damning indictment of minority culture for many Jihadists, 
however, is that it holds little or no relevance in the diaspora. There is no ‘myth of 
return’, no solace to be found in a nostalgic struggle for the homeland, and ethnic 
languages become defunct through neglect whilst English assumes the role of lingua 
franca.45 Moreover, ambient cultural racism46 serves to negate any intrinsic worth 
thought to reside in ethnic traditions and customs, whilst concomitantly those very 
same traditions and customs are exposed as adulterating a pristine Islamic 
orthodoxy.47  
The disenchantment with majority culture, on the other hand, is less clear cut, 
particularly as many Jihadists who, by virtue of being raised in a pervasively British 
environment and having imbibed many of its values and cultural norms, display a 
remarkably easy immersion into majority culture (particular popular, mainstream 
youth culture), prior to their radicalisation. However, clearly this comfortable 
embedment is disrupted at some point and gradually superseded by disillusionment 
with majority culture, as a result of perceptions of hedonism, consumerism, racism, 
inequality and the general imposition of conflicting core value-systems from the 
‘host’ society, which may render the individual unwilling or unable to perpetuate 
assimilation into the predominant paradigm. One way in which we might account for 
this cultural schizophrenia of sorts is by examining identity through the lens of self-
categorization theory.48 SCT contends that identity is not a static construction and that 
the self may be defined at different levels of abstraction depending upon differing 
                                                 
44 A slew of earlier reports following the ‘race riots’ of 2001 in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford had all 
drawn attention to precisely this sort of cumulative marginalisation of youth voices by decision makers 
and community leaders, see for example Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: A Report of the 
Independent Review Team (London: Home Office, 2001). 
45 Awan, ‘Transitional Religiosity Experiences: Contextual Disjuncture and Islamic Political 
Radicalism’, 217. 
46 Modood argues that the familiar ‘biological racism’ has gradually been displaced by a newer 
‘cultural racism’, which focuses on language, religion, family structures, dress and cuisine – traits that 
define what it means to be Asian, see Tariq Modood, Multicultural politics : racism, ethnicity and Muslims 
in Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 
47 The growth of an austere Wahhabism or Salafism amongst diasporic Muslim youth, that condemns 
many ethnic customs and norms as bidah (reprehensive religious innovation) is testament to this fact. 
48 John C Turner, Rediscovering the social group : a self-categorization theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988); Penelope J. Oakes, Stereotyping and Social Reality (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, 
Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1994). 
circumstances; at times it may be in terms of individual uniqueness, whilst at others, 
in terms of specific group membership.  
The salience of a communal identity, for example, may arise during periods of 
perceived group crisis or threat. For Jihadists these flashpoints may have been evoked 
by a range of contemporary events including, the Iraq war and the wider Global War 
on Terror; the Palestinian Intifada or the stagnation of the Middle East peace process; 
the banning of the veil and other European sartorial restrictions on Muslim women; 
the provocative publication of Danish cartoons of Muhammad deemed offensive to 
Muslims; and the resurgence of the Far Right and its convergence with the rise in 
Islamophobia in the US and Western Europe more generally.49 It is in these instances, 
that individuals become much more prone to reassessing what religious identity 
means to them, either as reconstruction in part of the lost minority identity or as a 
response to pressing questions and challenges from a pervasively non-Muslim 
environment.50  
Thus, in the absence of an appealing cultural paradigm from either minority or 
majority group, the individual simply resorts to a cultural entrenchment that assumes 
a religious hue by default, thus transforming religion, from religion per se, into the 
principal anchor of identity. Consequently, religion not only provides an emphatic 
rejoinder to Western identity, but is also interpreted de novo, without the perceived 
cultural accretions of the Islam associated with their parental or ethnic identity, 
thereby constructing a legitimate identity outside both minority and majority cultures. 
Take for instance the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab, who wrote in the final text 
messages to his father back in Nigeria, “I've found a new religion, the real Islam”; 
“You should just forget about me, I'm never coming back”; “Please forgive me. I will 
no longer be in touch with you”; and “Forgive me for any wrongdoing, I am no longer 
your child.”51 Olivier Roy argues, that globalized radical Islam is particularly 
attractive to diasporic Muslims precisely because it legitimises their sense of 
deculturation and uprootedness by refusing to identify Islam with the pristine cultures 
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of their parents, pointing to a strong correlation between deculturation and religious 
reformulation.52 
This dual cultural alterity, and the attendant forging of an identity distinct to 
both that bequeathed by parents, or assimilated from the wider host society, may help 
to explicate why a British jihadist of Pakistani or Jamaican provenance (Muhammad 
Siddique Khan or Germaine Lindsey respectively), who feels little or no identification 
with Britain, or their country of parental origin, but complete allegiance to the global 
community of believers or Ummah, might undertake a martyrdom operation in 
Britain, ostensibly in response to occupation in Iraq, Palestine or elsewhere.  
However, it would be erroneous to assume that an altruistic identification with 
an imagined community deemed to be under attack, ipso facto, leads to a proclivity 
towards martyrdom. Rather, many individuals experiencing identity dislocation 
through dual cultural alterity, and identifying instead with a beleaguered ummah, 
nevertheless eschew violence of any form themselves, either tacitly or apathetically 
accepting the status quo, or instead seeking redress through conventional political 
channels. Instead, those few individuals that are genuinely willing to countenance 
martyrdom, appear to do so for one of two of the following reasons. 
i) Political Empowerment: The eventual recourse to martyrdom can be 
understood in part as a desperate response to acutely felt feelings of political 
impotence. Political powerlessness, such as that witnessed in the wake of 
unprecedented anti-war marches and demonstrations in 2003 that nevertheless failed 
to avert the course of the Iraq war, can lead to disillusionment with, and alienation 
from, conventional political processes. Anwar al-Awlaki, perhaps the most important 
ideologue amongst English-speaking Jihadists until his killing in 2011, wrote a 
missive to the Somalian Jihadist group al-Shabaab in 2008, that lauded their 
employment of violence in the face of political impotence, 
“Al-Shabab [have given] us a living example of how we as Muslims should proceed to change 
our situation. The ballot has failed us but the bullet has not.”53  
 Hussain Osman, similarly alluding to political disenfranchisement of this nature, 
claimed that the bombs on July 21st were never meant to detonate or inflict death, but 
only to draw attention to the Iraq war, which he’d failed to achieve through legitimate 
means: 
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“I am against war . . . I’ve marched in peace rallies and nobody listened to me. I never 
thought of killing people.” 54  
Moreover, the inefficacy of conventional politics may be brought into sharper relief 
when starkly juxtaposed against the potent efficacy of illegitimate political 
interventions – take for example, perceptions of the 2004 Madrid train bombings as 
having ostensibly precipitated the early withdrawal of Spanish troops from the 
conflict in Iraq. Moreover, the potency of suicide terrorism in particular, for example - 
as a force multiplier that helps equalise an otherwise asymmetric conflict, has long 
been recognised by both terrorist groups and those they fight.55 Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
for example, extols the merits of suicide bombings to his readers stating,  
“the method of martyrdom operations is the most successful way of inflicting damage against 
the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in casualties.” 56 
Pape suggests that, even with the exclusion of the 9/11 attacks, suicide bombings 
conducted between 1980 and 2004 accounted for 48 per cent of all terrorism-related 
deaths even though they represented only three per cent of all terrorist incidents.57 
Western Jihadists, often self-conscious of their own lack of training and general 
military competence,58 no doubt astutely recognise the lethal effectiveness of suicide 
terrorism and its ability to compensate for their own shortcomings as enfeebled 
modern males.  
Muhammad Siddique Khan also expresses frustration with the apparent futility 
of conventional modes of political engagement, powerfully invoking a somewhat 
Fanonesque explanation for his eventual recourse to violence,59 
 “And our words have no impact upon you, therefore I'm going to talk to you in a language 
that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood.”60  
Perceiving a loss of personal agency, and in particular, feeling that he has been 
rendered powerless to prevent further violence against his community, Khan contends 
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that he must now communicate instead in the language of violence. The predication of 
the recourse to violence upon this realisation appears to be a familiar sentiment 
amongst many terrorists throughout history, who have claimed, often quite sincerely, 
that they only turned to violence when they felt they had no other choice.61 The 
understanding of terrorism as ‘talking in the language of blood’ is itself a largely 
uncontested concept; as Schmid and De Graaf suggest in their seminal text, Violence 
as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, terrorism is 
far better understood if it is viewed in the first instance as communication rather than 
as mere violence.62  
ii) Diverted Altruistic Energies: It is alluringly simple to conflate all Jihadist 
actions under the overarching rubric of terrorism, but there has long existed a 
hierarchy of legitimacy for Jihadist acts.63 Causes associated with national 
independence struggles against regimes perceived as repressive, such as those of 
Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine, enjoy widespread sympathy amongst Muslim 
publics and consequently have far greater legitimacy than, for example, obscure 
movements attempting to resurrect the Caliphate, or the global Jihadism of al-Qaeda. 
Similarly, conventional modes of warfare with combatants and military personnel are 
not granted the same inviolable taboo status as indiscriminate acts of terrorism against 
civilian populations. 
This then leads us to the second reason for the recourse to martyrdom; 
although individual Jihadists may ultimately undertake ‘martyrdom’ operations as an 
altruistic response to perceived occupation, there is little evidence to suggest that even 
those individuals who commit acts of suicide terrorism, do so as a matter of choice (or 
at least first choice). Instead, it appears that in many cases, potential radicals with 
romanticised and earnest, but largely inchoate notions of defending their community, 
can have their often laudable empathies diverted (due to a lack of accessibility to the 
principle cause), or manipulated to deadly effect.64 Western Muslim Jihadists are 
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particularly amenable to deflectionary tactics for a variety of reasons, including their 
proficiency in European languages, their lack of restrictions on international travel, 
and their potential ability to evade suspicion within their host societies. Combined 
with their very limited physical training experience, they possess much greater value 
as ‘smart bombs’,65 than conventional guerrillas or footsoldiers. Consequently, 
although volunteering for the Jihadist cause usually entails some degree of choice, 
recruits may quickly discover that individual agency is usurped by the group through 
the bay’ah (oath of allegiance) and normative expectations on obedience and 
conformity, as this chilling warning from Omar Khyam, the ringleader of the Crevice 
plot, to Muhammad Siddique Khan on how to behave at the training camp clearly 
demonstrates, 
“The only thing, one thing I will advise you yeah, is total obedience to whoever your emir is 
whether he is Sunni, Arab Chechen Saudi, British, total obedience, I don't know if heard about 
the (unclear) he disobeyed one order (unclear) lies cut out his throat, I'll tell you up there you 
can get your head cut off.”66 
Even in the case of the most infamous example of suicide terrorism to date, the attack 
on 9/11, it is patently clear that they key members of the Hamburg cell originally held 
aspirations to fight alongside separatist rebels in Chechnya,67 but were re-directed to 
Afghanistan for training, before later being told “that the Chechens do not need 
[fighters] anymore”.68 Similarly, there is strong evidence to suggest that at least two 
of the 7/7 bombers, Muhammad Siddique Khan and Shahzad Tanweer, initially 
spurred on by the prospect of fighting in the ‘Jihad’ in Afghanistan against the 
‘invading Crusaders’, were later diverted to attack the London transport network in 
2005. In a 2004 conversation with Omar Khyam, Khan appears to be relishing the 
prospect of fighting in Afghanistan, fully aware of the fact that he will not be allowed 
to return to the UK, 
 Omar Khyam: Are these lot ready bruv? [ready to go to Afghanistan]  
Mohammed Siddique Khan: Yeah 
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Omar Khyam: What I'll do is, I will talk to you tonight, inshallah. How quickly can these guys 
go? 
Mohammed Siddique Khan: Listen this can't come quick enough for them…. 
Omar Khyam: The Big Emir of the brothers is saying they can come, but it is a one way ticket. 
That's it if you agree with that bruv, it's not a problem bruv. If it's a one way ticket. You 
understand that. You agree with that, inshallah. 
Mohammed Siddique Khan: Inshallah.69 
However, clearly illustrating the established hierarchy of legitimacy for Jihadist 
actions, Khan, eager to wage defensive Jihad in Afghanistan against NATO troops, 
displays uncertainty and discomfort over Omar Khyam’s connections to terrorism 
later in the conversation,  
MSK: Are you really a terrorist eh?  
KHYAM: They're working with us  
MSK: You're serious, you are basically  
KHYAM: No I'm not a terrorist but they are working through us  
MSK: Who are, there's no one higher than you (unclear).70  
In some cases, a gradual progression to increasingly more egregious modes of 
violence, that subvert the individual’s initial largely humanistic aspirations, may be 
witnessed. British Jihadists who having partaken in (and survived) ‘legitimate 
defensive Jihad’ in theatres of conflict from Bosnia to Iraq, inevitably return to their 
host societies. These survivors, brutalised by the ravages of war and possibly 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, may prove less capable of rehabilitation 
back into mainstream society, and consequently may more easily resort to more 
extreme or taboo modes of violence in the future.  
In all of the scenarios presented above, individuals may not have initially 
wished to participate in these highly ‘controversial’ operations, but by that point they 
have long crossed the Rubicon. One of the patent successes of al-Qaeda has been its 
ability to co-opt diverse motivations, aspirations, grievances and causes, and 
ultimately divert, channel and redirect these energies for their own ends. 
 
ii) Religion & Salvation 
One of the enduring myths surrounding suicide bombers has been the ascendancy of 
religious motivations for ‘martyrdom’, over other more ‘worldly’ concerns, with 
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many commentators pursuing a prurient focus on hour al-ayn or heavenly maidens. 
This is not to contest the fact that the recourse to martyrdom may be shaped by 
substantive religious or spiritual desires, yearnings and experiences that cannot simply 
be summarily dismissed, as is often the wont of many reductive strains of literature on 
religious change within the social sciences.71 Indeed, it is patently evident from the 
religious rhetoric of many Jihadists drawn to martyrdom that salvific motives do 
ostensibly appear to factor heavily in their decisions. Many of these individuals 
frequently allude to canonical traditions that explicitly reinforce the notion of ‘other-
worldly’ rewards as recompense for ‘this-worldly’ sacrifice. These may include, inter 
alia, forgiveness for one’s sins; evading the reckoning on the Day of Judgement; 
marriage to 72 heavenly maidens; intercession on behalf of 70 sinful family members; 
bestowal of dignity and glory; and ultimately, the guarantee of eternal Paradise.72 
Shahzad Tanweer, who earlier claimed to be motivated by the West’s injustices 
against his community, nevertheless invokes the ‘promise’ of Paradise as being 
central to his rationale,  
“We are 100 per cent committed to the cause of Islam, we love death the way you love life… 
As for you who have been affected by this reminder give your lives for Allah's cause. For in 
truth this is the best transaction as Allah ... says: 'Better that Allah has chosen to deliver their 
lives and their properties for the price that they should be the paradise; they fight Allah's 
cause so they kill and are killed is the promising truth that is binding ...And who is truer to his 
promise than Allah? Then rejoice in the life in which you have concluded that is the supreme 
success.”73  
Muhammad Siddique Khan also tempers his earlier altruistic, but ‘secular’ motives, 
by introducing a sacred dimension to his rationale. This is accomplished through the 
invocation of familiar tropes from istishādi testaments, such as obedience to God, the 
conscious spurning of worldly pleasures, and a yearning for paradise: 
 
“I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation 
doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam - 
obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and 
messenger Muhammad... This is how our ethical stances are dictated… 
I myself, I make dua (pray) to Allah... to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, 
the messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr 
Ayman al-Zawahri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are 
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fighting in the... of this cause. With this I leave you to make up your own minds and I ask you to 
make dua to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and enter us into 
gardens of paradise.”74  
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, presents a similarly curious mix of secular and sacred 
motives, by first providing a very careful reasoning of his participation in Jihad as 
constituting not only a religious duty, but a virtuous deed: 
“In late 2009, in fulfilment of a religious obligation, I decided to participate in jihad against 
the United States. The Koran obliges every able Muslim to participate in jihad and fight in the 
way of Allah, those who fight you…Participation in jihad against the United States [sic] is 
considered among the most virtuous of deeds in Islam and is highly encouraged in the 
Koran… If you laugh at us now, we will laugh at you later in this life and on the day of 
judgment by God’s will, and our final call is all praise to Allah, the lord of the universe, 
Allahu Akbar.”75 
However, the essential and underlying reasons for his recourse to martyrdom are, 
once again, highly political and secular, 
“I had an agreement with at least one person to attack the United States in retaliation for U.S. 
support of Israel and in retaliation of the killing of innocent and civilian Muslim populations 
in Palestine, especially in the blockade of Gaza, and in retaliation for the killing of innocent 
and civilian Muslim populations in Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and beyond, most of 
them women, children, and non-combatants.”76 
Consequently, it becomes extremely difficult, if not nigh impossible, to delineate that 
which is genuinely ‘religious’ from other more secular factors, particularly if all we 
have to base this on, is the overtly sanctified and highly-stylised discourse of the 
individuals themselves. Thus, whilst we must give credence to their stated sacred 
intentions, and their own attribution of meaning to their actions, we must also be 
cognisant of the post hoc attribution of meaning and validation to these acts. As 
Speckhard and Akhmedova, studying the motivations of Chechen female suicide 
terrorists, suggest: “[the] statements of the individuals involved in terrorism appear 
less of a driving force for their participation than as a means of justifying their 
actions”.77  
Martyrdom testaments belong to a highly stylised genre, and thus need to 
display certain religious tropes and conform to established archetypes for conferral of 
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the status of martyr by the wider community. Indeed, if an individual is to be 
successfully accepted as a martyr, he needs to not only look and behave like a martyr, 
but to also adopt the language of the martyr. As Robert Pape suggests, “Only a 
community can make a martyr…using elaborate ceremonies…to identify the death of 
a suicide attacker, [and] promote the idea that their members should be accorded 
martyr status.”78 This desire to fulfil the normative expectations of an imagined 
community of belief (the ummah), combined with the dual cultural alterity identified 
earlier, through which identity can assume a religious hue by default, may help 
explain the conspicuous religiosity contained within many Jihadist narratives. 
Moreover, this frequent invocation of ‘the sacred’ by individuals is also likely to be 
symptomatic of the primacy of theological legitimation amongst Jihadist ideologues 
themselves,79 who have shrewdly, and indeed successfully, managed to yoke religion 
to profane political goals, in order to manufacture constituencies, legitimise violence, 
and eliminate dissent.80 Indeed, Jihadist ideologues, who often display a glaringly 
conspicuous absence of personal religious credentials, having undergone modern 
secular educations,81 have long been astutely cognisant of the immense potency 
religion offers. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, the efforts of Jihadist leaders to 
adorn themselves in the regalia of religion, most recognisably in their impeccable 
white robes, pious beards and saintly turbans, alongside the employment of a 
superfluously religio-canonic rhetoric,82 should be understood first and foremost as a 
compensatory mechanism for theological illiteracy, and a fervent desire to usurp this 
potent religious mantle from traditional religious authority figures. 
Conversely however, many individuals display largely apathetic attitudes 
towards religion, and so in these cases it may even be disingenuous to associate 
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religious sentiments with martyrdom.83 Hussain Osman, for example, informed Italian 
investigators in no uncertain terms that, “religion had nothing to do with it. We were 
shown videos of the Iraq war and told we must do something big”.84 In fact, one of 
the most intriguing findings vis-à-vis the religiosity of jihadists, has been the 
discovery that the vast majority of those drawn to Jihadism are not particularly 
religious prior to their radicalisation. Indeed, most individuals were either raised in 
largely secular households, or possessed only a rudimentary grasp of their parental 
faith, which rarely extended to religious praxis of any sort.85 It is only after 
experiencing a religious awakening or a Transitional Religiosity Experience,86 in 
conjunction with the dual cultural alterity (through which Islam becomes, by default, 
the principal anchor of identity), that religion becomes a potentially useful variable in 
the overall analysis.  
 
iii) Impotence & Ennui  
It is alluringly simple to posit that those drawn to Jihadist martyrdom are likely to be 
highly ideologically committed individuals, possessing coherent and well-developed 
worldviews, and with clear, cogent motives for their participation in acts that will 
ultimately claim their very lives. Bainbridge and Stark, writing on the weltanschaung 
or meaning system of religious adherents in general, suggest this is a highly 
contentious assumption to make, but surprisingly common amongst social scientists.87 
I would suggest this inference is all the more appealing to researchers studying 
suicide terrorism, as the projection of rationality, cogency, agency and coherency onto 
subjects and their acts, ostensibly helps us to make sense of the ‘senseless’ and 
explain the ‘unexplainable’. 
Nevertheless, it appears that an increasing number of individuals engaging in, 
or at least aspiring to suicide terrorism, are drawn to the phenomenon for reasons that 
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may initially defy reason, or seem inexplicable. Indeed, for some of these aspiring 
Jihadists, the recourse to martyrdom is less about altruism, salvific yearnings, or 
political disenfranchisement, and more about an egoistical desire for meaning and 
purpose in one’s life, often in order to overcome an unbearable ennui borne largely of 
underachievement. In these instances, the turn to jihadism serves as an emphatic 
rejection of the banality and monotonous inanity of daily life, providing, perhaps for 
the first time, a sense of being part of an elite group that compensates for the 
shortcomings of one’s own trivial existence,88 or as Sageman suggests, “martyrdom 
lifts them from their insignificance”.89  
Anthony Garcia, one of the failed 2004 ‘Bluewater bomb’ plotters, appears to 
epitomise this motif. Garcia left school at the age of sixteen with few qualifications 
and no discernible ambitions, instead peripatetically drifting from one menial job to 
another. Prior to his arrest, Garcia had been working nightshifts stacking shelves at a 
local supermarket, but spent much of his time daydreaming about becoming a Jihadi 
fighter, with the Jihadist fantasy clearly providing a form of escapism from the daily 
tedium and drudgery of his otherwise uneventful life.90 Both Richard Reid, the ‘shoe 
bomber’ who tried to detonate an Atlantic flight in mid-air in December of 2001, and 
Mukhtar Said Ibrahim, one of the failed 21st July 2005 bombers, also potentially fit 
this profile well. Reid was raised in a largely dysfunctional home, quickly descending 
into petty street crime, and spent much of his early life in prison.91 Similarly, Ibrahim, 
a child asylum seeker from Eritrea, spent much of his youth in and around drugs, 
street gangs, violence and youth offender institutions.92 Whilst the ennui thesis 
certainly goes some way towards accounting for Reid and Ibrahim’s fascination with 
martyrdom, both individuals also appear to have been drawn to radical Islam whilst 
incarcerated, suggesting that the espousal of Jihadism may possibly also constitute a 
form of recidivism that supplants more conventional modes of criminality.93 
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Chivalrous Knights, Heroes and Real Men 
These latent feelings of purposelessness can in some cases be triggered or 
compounded by a sense of personal impotence, particularly if the individual begins to 
feel that the debilitating effects of an emasculating,94 atomising, anomic modernity 
have rendered him a mere husk of a man. It is only via the redemptive prism of the 
chivalrous jihadi warrior, through which he is recast as the community’s champion as 
a result of his heroic sacrifice, that the individual then discerns a mechanism to 
reclaim agency, purpose, self-esteem and manhood.95 Muhammad Siddique Khan’s 
martyrdom video emphatically refers to his coterie of martyrs as ‘real men’, pointedly 
distinguishing them from the emasculated individuals who ‘stay at home’.96   
The appeal to the valiant holy warrior or chivalrous knight is a recurring trope 
in Jihadist literature, and indeed it is no accident that Ayman al-Zawahiri’s most 
important work is entitled, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner (Fursan Taht Rayah 
Al-Nabi),97 shrewdly seeking to exploit traditional Muslim male sensitivities around 
chivalry, honour, shame and sacrifice. The astute framing of this loss of dignity as 
being somehow sinful, offers up the prospect of redemption, and absolution through 
sacrifice and martyrdom.98  
Muhammad Siddique Khan exemplifies the transformative power offered by 
the martyr’s mask, undergoing the ready metamorphosis from children’s learning 
mentor to heroic avenging soldier,   
“I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters…And 
until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop 
this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation. 
I make dua (pray) to Allah... to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the 
messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden”99  
However, martyrdom provides not just the means through which the powerless 
individual can reclaim agency and manhood, but increasingly, the ability to brazenly 
usurp traditional authority and power normally reserved for clerics, and religious or 
political leaders. These shifts in influence are in part due to the fact that the 
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individuals act predominantly within the New Media Environment, whose largely 
egalitarian and democratising nature,100 is conducive to the ‘levelling’ of hierarchies 
of knowledge and power.101 However, equally importantly, this reconfiguration of 
power and authority is also predicated in large part upon the ascendancy of deeds over 
words. As Awan et al., contend, the Jihadists’ tangible response to a perceived attack 
against the Ummah is uniquely placed in the Muslim world, particularly when starkly 
juxtaposed against the apathy, weakness or inaction of Muslim rulers, clergy and even 
other Islamists. No matter how odious or counterproductive this response has been, 
the Jihadists cannot be accused by opponents of procrastination or indolence. 
Consequently their manifest deeds enable them to undermine the credibility of other 
dissenting voices that use words alone, thus arrogating to themselves the authority of 
‘Islamic officialdom’.102 As evidence of this trend within the British context, we 
might point to the example of Muhammad Siddique Khan, who despite being 
‘theologically illiterate’, nevertheless felt emboldened enough to disparage traditional 
Muslim scholars in Britain, suggesting that ‘real men’ like himself, whose deeds and 
sacrifices were self-evident, were far more worthy of the Prophet’s legacy:  
 
“Our so-called scholars today are content with their Toyotas and their semi-detached 
houses... If they fear the British Government more than they fear Allah then they must desist in 
giving talks, lectures and passing fatwas and they need to stay at home – they’re useless – and 
leave the job to the real men, the true inheritors of the prophet.”103  
Hyperreality: The Medium of Martyrdom 
As we have seen, the Arabic word for martyr in the Quran - shahīd, stems from the 
Arabic verb ‘to see’ or ‘to witness’, and therefore if we understand martyrdom to 
mean bearing witness through one’s sacrifice, and thus making an example of one’s 
death, then the arena that has largely enabled the publicising of martyrdom has been 
the internet. Indeed, it is now well recognised that within the last decade, the internet 
has become the principal platform for the dissemination and mediation of the culture 
and ideology of jihadism.104 The unique multimedia environment of the Internet in 
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particular lends itself to the construction of a hyperreality; the paradoxical notion of a 
mediated phenomenon that appears more real than reality itself.105 This hyperreality 
can be thought of as an enhanced reality that ‘cocoons’ the participant in a wholly 
mediated environment concocted from a plethora of images, texts and videos (which 
may have been manipulated in a myriad disingenuous ways), all filtered through the 
jihadist lens and through which the individual unwittingly experiences reality by 
proxy.106  
It is in this cloistered yet highly immersive environment, that relies on emotive 
imagery and other affective content to venerate the martyr above all else, that the true 
power of the medium in lionising martyrdom becomes patently evident. The appeal to 
the emotions or senses, through polished Jihadist video montages, stirring devotional 
songs and fawning hagiographies of martyrs, in lieu of appeals to reason, or 
theological and ideological considerations, appears tailored towards the newer 
generation of young, diasporic, non-Arabic speaking, digital natives,107 who now 
contribute disproportionately to the Jihadist demographic.108 Moreover, the 
hyperreality of the Internet has been so eminently successful in engendering 
martyrdom, that those individuals who substantially contribute to this arena have 
themselves become lauded as ‘celebrities’, in some cases, even by traditional Jihadist 
figureheads. Take for instance the example of Younis Tsouli (aka Irhaabi 007 or 
Terrorist 007), a web-savvy student in London whose contributions to the global Jihad 
were confined to autonomously promulgating the visual culture of Jihadism from his 
bedroom PC, but who nevertheless received considerable acclaim from Jihadists 
around the world, including Jihadist ‘luminaries’ like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the 
infamous head of al-Qaeda in Iraq). The important role played by these ‘media 
Jihadists’ in encouraging martyrdom is evident from Tsouli’s fawning exchange with 
a fellow forum member, ‘Abuthaabit’,  
“This media work, I am telling you, is very important. Very, very, very, very . . . Because a lot 
of the funds brothers are getting is because they are seeing stuff like this coming out. Imagine 
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how many people have gone [to Iraq] after seeing the situation because of the videos. Imagine 
how many of them could have been shahid [martyrs] as well.”109 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As Durkheim’s seminal thesis demonstrated more than a century ago, motivations for 
suicide can be extraordinarily complex even under ‘normal’ circumstances,110 and 
thus discerning the motivations for an act as complicated as taking one’s life in a 
violent manner that deliberately harms others too, is no simple feat. As we have seen 
from the life narratives of a number of Jihadists in Britain, individuals can engage in 
suicide terrorism for myriad reasons. However, I have tentatively suggested that this 
plethora of motivations and biographical diversity can be fundamentally distilled into 
the following three ideal types: i) a diversion of altruistic empathies, positing 
martyrdom as a strategic liberation strategy that equalises the asymmetry of an unjust 
conflict, conducted on behalf of an ‘imagined’, besieged community; ii) a highly 
ritualised form of sacralised, performative violence, in fulfilment of deeply-felt 
salvific yearnings, and as a path to paradise; and iii) a mythical or heroic sacrifice, 
conferring immortality through the prospect of living on in the memory of others, and 
motivated by ennui or impotence. 
Drawing the field internationally, we may be able to identify the existence of a 
number of other potential motifs that ostensibly do not appear to have any resonance 
within the British context. Take for example, poverty as a motivator for suicide 
terrorism,111 evident from the case of Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving terrorist from 
the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whose impoverished family were promised Rs 150,000 by 
Lashkar e-Taiba upon successful completion of the operation.112 Alternatively, we 
might draw attention to the numerous cases of suicide terrorism in actual theatres of 
conflict that have been motivated by direct personal loss and trauma, such as those of 
the ‘Black Widows’ in Chechnya, who in many cases volunteer for operations after 
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having witnessed the deaths of their husbands or other family members by Russian 
forces.113 Finally, we might identify certain communities, such as Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories, who as a response to occupation, and feelings of humiliation 
and shame, appear to promulgate a celebratory ‘cult of martyrdom’, thus providing a 
socio-cultural sanction for suicide bombings.114 Whilst these three examples may 
seem far removed from the experiences of Jihadist martyrs in Britain, one of the 
central arguments of this paper has been that feelings such as loss, trauma, 
occupation, humiliation or poverty, can be experienced vicariously, particularly 
through the hyperreality offered by the New Media Environment, and these simulacra 
of injustice may be perceived by the participant, to be as ‘real’ as any lived reality.  
As these examples demonstrate, even the relatively simple task of establishing 
linkages between experiences and actions can be problematic, and thus discerning 
motivations for martyrdom is clearly fraught with difficulties. Indeed, even in our 
final analysis, we are left, rather curiously, with a potentially unhelpful set of 
mutually exclusive dichotomies;  
i) The suicide terrorist as: the altruist, selflessly sacrificing his life in 
defence of his community, in stark contrast to, the egoist who selfishly 
uses his death to escape from ennui and impotence, in order to claim 
agency, purpose, manhood or salvation. 
ii) The suicide terrorist as: the profane, this-worldly martyr who seeks fame, 
adulation, agency and political power, in stark contrast to, the sacred, 
other-worldly martyr who seeks religious salvation and Paradise.115 
Having devoted this paper to elucidating the motivations and causes of suicide 
martyrdom, it seems fitting to conclude by reviewing the consequences and results of 
these actions too. In the overwhelming majority of cases, Jihadist suicide terrorism 
has been shown to be not only ineffectual, but largely counter-intuitive. Indeed, al-
Qaeda and its affiliates, having diverted the energies of hundreds of young Muslim 
men and women by sending them to their premature deaths, have failed to achieve 
any of the aims with which Muslim publics may have been deemed to initially share 
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some sympathy.116 Instead, their strategy has proven to be grossly counter-productive, 
resulting in the invasion and occupation of two Muslim majority countries by Western 
powers,117 and the demise of al-Qaeda and its affiliates through the so-called Global 
War on Terror. Perhaps more importantly, the Jihadists’ penchant for bloodshed and 
violent excess, allied with their frighteningly dystopic and intolerant vision of a post-
Jihadist future, has also led to widespread alienation amongst Muslim audiences.118 
Consequently, Jihadism is now largely a spent force, having simultaneously been both 
undermined and side-lined by the Arab Spring sweeping through the Middle East and 
North Africa,119 which has been inspired by similar grievances, including the removal 
of Western-backed autocratic rulers, and the lack of employment and other 
opportunities for the rapidly growing ‘youth bulge’ in the Arab world. 
Indeed, we might conclude by contrasting the senseless futility of the hundreds 
of al-Qaeda affiliated suicide martyrdoms, that have wrought death and destruction, 
but little else, with the suicide martyrdom of a young Tunisian protestor, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, whose self-immolation proved to be the catalyst for not only the successful 
socio-political revolt in Tunisia, but also provided the critical spark for the Arab 
Spring that transformed the Arab political landscape forever. 
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